EasyBear is a user-friendly platform — like Uber — that connects a technician, working in our app, directly with the customer. Our own software is the core that runs scheduling, document signing and easy online payment, and AI replaces all of our operators and the entire back office.
Not a lead marketplace, and not software we sell to contractors — the platform runs the job itself.
Open to accredited investors only, as defined in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D. Offering conducted under Rule 506(c).
Commerce figures are as of September 4, 2026, taken from the production payment ledger; test fixtures are excluded. Orders are counted by the date they were created, in Pacific Time; charges by the date they settled.
Demand was held at this level on purpose. Paid acquisition has been off since early July, Yelp inquiries arrive faster than they are taken, and the platform was never opened wider than the parts of it that were finished — an unfinished surface was not something to put in front of a paying customer.
Orders: 2
Collected: $0
Orders: 14
Collected: $0
Orders: 23
Collected: $3,917
Orders: 31
Collected: $3,533
Orders: 31
Collected: $1,291
Orders: 52
Collected: $3,866
Orders: 55
Collected: $5,094
Orders: 5
Collected: $1,529
A marketplace sells your request to several businesses and leaves the choosing to you.
A platform keeps the request, measures every technician on it, and sends you the best one who is free.
Marketplace
Yelp, Thumbtack, Angi, Google LSA
Platform
EasyBear
Who picks the technician
You, from a list of companies
We do, by measured performance
Whose rating you see
The company's
The technician's own
Where your request goes
Sold to about four businesses
Stays with us
What happens next
They all call you
One confirmed appointment
When the business earns
On the lead
Only when the job is done
Software vendors — ServiceTitan, Housecall Pro — sit in neither column: they sell tools to the contractor and never touch the customer.
Every job is profitable for us. The cost of finding the customer sits inside the split, not on our side of it.
We keep the smallest take per booking in the industry — on purpose. That is how technicians come to us, and keep coming.
The best keep up to 80% of the invoice. An ordinary repair company pays 30–50%.
Rates are earned, not negotiated. We measure what the platform actually earns per booking a technician accepts — take a job and not convert it, and it costs us the same as never taking it.
Designed, not yet in effect. Metrics described here are computed today; the rate ladder is not. As of August 29, 2026.
Designed — what a technician keeps of the invoice, by tier.
Live today
Computed on every job, for every technician.
Designed
Specified, not built. Nothing below changes a payout today.
Platforms in home services are not new. What has not been built before is one where the operating layer itself is the AI — no operators, no back office.
Turning a large lead business into a platform is not an idea problem. It is an alignment problem — years of agreement across every part of a company that already works.
And even with the idea and the will at the top, the follower starts behind. There is no voice AI on the shelf that carries a repair call end to end, and no CRM on the market shaped for this work. We built both.
Uber was founded in 2009. Lyft followed the same model and became a real company — today Uber is worth roughly $160B and Lyft roughly $7B, about twenty-three times apart.
Home services is where taxis were then. Whoever moves second here spends the first years building the technology, not the business.
And a company that likes the model has a shorter path than copying it: buying into the one that started first.
Market capitalisation
23 times apart
The founder and CEO has invested close to $40K of his own capital and more than 3,000 hours of his own time, working without a salary.
as of August 2026
EasyBear Inc. is raising a pre-seed round from accredited investors. Any offering is made only under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D and only through definitive offering documents. Accredited status must be verified before any subscription is accepted.
Figures in this deck are as of the dates shown on the slides — the traction slide covers April 7 – May 8, 2026, and the deck is not restated between versions. Revenue and completed jobs have grown since that window; current figures are available on request.
Review the materials on this page.
Email ceo@easybear-appliancerepair.com — written inquiries only.
Accredited-investor verification — required by law before we may accept any subscription.
Sign the SAFE via Carta; wire directly to EasyBear Inc.
Written inquiries only — we don't do intro calls. The materials on this page cover everything a first call would.
The first meeting, on demand. Everything an intro call would cover — chapters 01 to 07, in order, about 40 minutes total. Chapter 08 is a long-form interview with the founder, another 56 minutes.
The product, live — booking to dispatch with zero staff
The complete pitch deck, narrated
The repair-side math, order by order
The insurance layer on top of repair
Why vertically integrated AI wins this market
Hear the voice operator handle real calls
Who is building this, in one minute
The long-form conversation with the founder — English voice-over
Videos contain forward-looking statements and estimates; they are part of the same offering materials as the deck and are qualified by the legend below.
We publish an engineering ledger: how the company started, what shipped week by week, and the numbers behind the build.
Read the build log→The minimum is $5,000. The instrument is the standard Y Combinator post-money SAFE — we fill in two numbers and change nothing else in it.
The valuation cap is $8M post-money. For the first $100,000 of this round we write SAFEs at a $5M cap instead; that is the whole of the early-investor advantage, with no separate percentage discount on top.
The round is $500,000. Money goes directly to EasyBear, Inc. — no placement agents, no finders, no intermediaries.
A SAFE is not a loan and not yet a share. You send money now and receive shares later, when we raise a priced round.
The share price is set by that round, but capped for you at the valuation cap above. That cap is the early investor's entire advantage: the later the round, the more shares the same money buys you.
It pays no interest, has no maturity date, and carries no dividend, no board seat and no vote.
There is no repayment date, and we will not invent one. A SAFE is not debt: no interest, no maturity, and no obligation on us to buy it back.
Your SAFE converts into shares at our next priced round. After a pre-seed that is typically twelve to thirty-six months — sometimes longer, and possibly never.
Cash, if it comes, comes after that: a later round in which existing investors are allowed to sell part of their position, an acquisition, or eventually a public listing.
Plan on three or more years of complete illiquidity and on the real possibility of losing everything you put in. If you need a defined return date, this is the wrong instrument for you, and we would rather say so now than after you have wired.
We cannot tell you, and any founder who gives you a number is either guessing or breaking the law. Returns on private securities cannot be promised.
What we can describe is how this asset class behaves. Most early-stage investments return nothing; investors accept that in exchange for a small chance at an outsized outcome.
For scale: First Round Capital's $510,000 seed investment in Uber was worth roughly $2.5 billion at Uber's 2019 IPO, about 4,900 times over nine years. That is a documented fact about Uber, not a forecast for EasyBear.
Our own argument is narrower. Nobody has yet built the platform model for U.S. home services, a market forecast near $1.4 trillion by 2030. In food delivery that same model beat the marketplace model outright: Grubhub led the category, DoorDash overtook it, and DoorDash now holds roughly 60% of U.S. food delivery.
Partly protected, and it is worth being exact, because this is the most commonly mis-explained part of a SAFE.
Your ownership is your investment divided by the post-money cap, fixed on the day you sign. Every SAFE we sell after yours dilutes the founders, not you — that is precisely what the post-money form protects against, and it is why we use it.
What it does not do is protect you forever. At the priced round your SAFE converts into ordinary shares, and from that moment the new investors' money and any new option pool dilute you like every other shareholder, as does every round after.
Pro-rata rights and MFN are not part of the standard YC post-money SAFE. We will sign an MFN side letter on request at any check size, and we consider pro-rata side letters from $100,000.
The founder has put in close to $40,000 of his own money and more than 3,000 hours without a salary.
Two outside investors have come in at $5,000 each. Both work in home services themselves, one of them directly in appliance repair.
We are not going to dress this up: this round is early and small, and you would be among the first outside shareholders. That is exactly why the cap is $5M for the first $100,000 rather than the $8M we write afterwards.
We have been live in California since February 2026 — San Francisco first, then Sacramento — with completed, paid jobs every month since.
The average ticket over the last ninety days is about $350, and our rating is 5.0 across our Google reviews.
Roughly three quarters of booking requests, and two thirds of completed-job volume, arrive through channels we pay nothing for. The only per-lead channel we buy today is Yelp.
There are no human operators at all: our own voice AI answers every call, twenty to thirty on an ordinary day.
As of August 2026 we take 30% of the customer's invoice. The technician keeps 70% and buys parts out of his share.
On a $350 job that is roughly $105 to the platform, against about 3% payment processing and, for jobs that came from bought leads, the cost of the lead.
Jobs from our own organic channel carry no acquisition cost at all. That is why the organic engine matters more to this business than the size of the ticket does.
That flat rate is today's rate, not the design. The model we have designed is a tier ladder: the company's share moves between 20% and 70% by the technician's tier, and it is taken on the whole invoice — labor and parts together — rather than on labor alone with parts bought out of the technician's share.
The ladder is designed and not yet in effect: every technician on the platform today is on the flat 30%.
On parts, the direction we expect to take is buying them centrally at trade prices, which raises our margin and the technician's take-home at the same time.
The allocation bands are in the Ask above. This is what they buy.
The largest share is reserves and working capital. A good technician only stays if he is fully loaded with work, and loading him before the revenue arrives is exactly what this capital is for.
The next share is team salaries, funded from those reserves until the business covers itself. What remains — AI, infrastructure, legal — is deliberately small.
Appliance repair is a real business on its own and the right first vertical: high frequency, light licensing, and a ticket small enough that customers decide quickly.
It is also where we prove the machinery — acquisition, dispatch, e-signature, payment, quality control — that carries over unchanged into higher-ticket home services.
The honest obstacle in the licensed trades is not software but licensing and liability. Those trades require state licensing per contractor and heavier insurance, so entering them is a compliance project as much as a product one.
Supply, not demand. The best technicians already have work and are slow to move to a small company, and we do not tell them we are bigger than we are — the technician-tier ladder set out on this page is our answer to that.
Loading a good technician fully takes working capital we do not yet have, which is most of what this round is for.
Our organic channel is strong for a domain this young, but our domain authority is still low, so a large part of our own catalogue does not yet rank.
We are a small team working without salaries, at a scale where a single bad month is visible in the numbers. Everything above should be read with that in mind.
Only accredited investors, as defined in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D.
Any offering is made under Rule 506(c), which requires us to verify your accredited status before we may accept a subscription.
Recent IRS income forms, account statements together with a credit report, or a letter from a licensed attorney, CPA, broker-dealer or registered investment adviser dated within the last three months.
We will walk you through it, and nothing is uploaded on this site.
The materials above cover what an intro call would, and the build log covers how it was all made.
Written questions get precise, documented answers. That is better for both sides, and it keeps our hours on the business.
No. We use the standard Y Combinator post-money SAFE, which is a publicly published financing form that anyone may use.
EasyBear is not affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by Y Combinator.
We spend on scale: expanding beyond California state by state, and training our contractor technicians through our own online courses in sales and in appliance repair.
We also plan to sell appliance insurance policies to customers we have just served, at no additional acquisition cost.
We expect unit economics to improve several times over once insurance launches and contractor training begins. That is the next round's work, not this one's.
Company facts and figures on this page and in the materials are as of August 2026 unless dated otherwise.
This page is a communication of EasyBear, Inc., a Delaware C-Corporation. It is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy securities except as permitted under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D; any offer is made only to verified accredited investors and only through definitive offering documents. Securities of EasyBear, Inc. have not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or any state securities laws, are offered in reliance on an exemption, and are subject to restrictions on transfer. Neither the SEC nor any state securities regulator has approved, disapproved, or passed upon the merits of any offering or the accuracy of these materials. Investing in an early-stage company involves a high degree of risk, including illiquidity and the possible loss of your entire investment. This page and the linked materials contain forward-looking statements — including projections and unit-economics estimates — that reflect current assumptions and are not guarantees of future performance; actual results may differ materially. Nothing here is investment, legal, or tax advice. This is not an offer in any jurisdiction where such an offer would be unlawful.